Albert speer nuremberg trials testimony

SPEER: After this telephone call further measures were to be taken in France to increase the number of workers available for allocation.

Minutes of a Fuehrer conference which I found recently, namely, those of the meeting of 3 to 5 January , show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for local industry and economy. President, I shall submit this document later because up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to As you have already stated, the minutes of a Fuehrer conference of 3 to 5 January, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later on, are connected with this.

Will you please make a brief statement on the subject of that discussion? It contains stern injunctions from Hitler concerning the ways and means that he contemplated using to this end. It states that acts of sabotage are to be punished with the most rigorous means and that "humanitarian muddleheadedness" is out of place. These minutes also show that at that time I asked Hitler to transfer the management of production questions in France to me, a step which was actually taken several months later.

I mention this only for the purpose of making it clear, while I am still in a position to testify as a witness, that I did not carry out Hitler's policy of abandoning all "humanitarian muddleheadedness" in France. My attention was drawn to one case in which 10 hostages were to be shot as a reprisal for acts of industrial sabotage committed in the Meurthe-et-Moselle district.

At that time I managed to prevent the sentence from being carried out. Roechling, who was at that time in charge of iron production in the occupied western territories, is my witness in this case. That is the only case I know of where hostages were to be shot on account of sabotage in production.

I can also prove that, through a decision by Hitler dated September , I was responsible for providing a supplementary meal in addition to the existing ration for factory workers employed in France.

In a letter which I sent to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in December , I strongly urged the necessity not only of paying wages to the workers in the occupied western territories, but also of making available to them a corresponding quantity of consumer goods-a line of policy which doubtless does not accord with the policy of plundering the western regions, on which so much stress has been laid by the French Prosecution.

All three documents are in my possession and they can be produced. I only mention these facts to show that I neither approved nor followed the very harsh policy laid down by Hitler for application in France in the records of 3 to 5 January. Herr Speer, what did you have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?

SPEER: We have already discussed this at sufficient length No armament goods were manufactured, only bottleneck parts and consumer goods. The Prosecution has submitted to you minutes of a Fuehrer conference-Rdated March and containing a statement that you discussed with Hitler the Reich Marshal's proposal to deliver prisoners of war to France.

From January until May I was seriously ill, and the discussion took place without me. A member of my staff was in charge of this discussion-a man who enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in an unusually high degree. In any case, the proposal was not carried out.

Will you comment briefly on that point? SPEER: I should like to say that I wanted a delegate to deal with all labor allocation problems connected with my task of military armament production. My chief concern in the allocation problem, at the beginning of my term of office, was with the Gauleiter, who carried on a policy of Gau particularism.

The nonpolitical offices of the Labor Ministry could not proceed against the Gauleiter, and the result was that manpower inside Germany was frozen. I suggested to Hitler that he should appoint a Gauleiter whom I knew to this post-a man named Hanke.

Goering, by the way, has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed. Two days later, Bormann made the suggestion that Sauckel be chosen. I did not know Sauckel well, but I was quite ready to accept the choice. It is quite possible that Sauckel did not know. The office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was created in the following way:. Lammers declared that he could not issue special authority for a fraction of labor allocation as that would be doubtful procedure from an administrative point of view, and for that reason the whole question of manpower would have to be put into the hands of a plenipotentiary.

At first they contemplated a Fuehrer decree. A compromise was made, therefore, in accordance with which Sauckel was to be the Plenipotentiary General within the framework of the Four Year Plan, although he would be appointed by Hitler.

This was a unique arrangement under the Four Year Plan. Thereby Sauckel was in effect subordinated to Hitler; and he always looked upon it in that way. I would not have had any use for him, for after all, we had to carry out practical work.

In I had not yet anything to do with armament; and even later, during the period of Sauckel's activity, I did not appoint these delegates and did not do much to promote their activities. That was a matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction. According to this record you gave a special order for transport trains with foreign workers. SPEER: I believe it would be practical to deal at the same time with all the statements made by Sauckel which apply to me; that will save time.

It is possible that air raids or a sudden change in the production program made it necessary for my office to ask for transport trains to be rerouted; but the responsibility for that always rested with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. Sauckel also testified here that after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war effort. Stalingrad was in January , and Goebbels started on his "total war effort" in August After Stalingrad a great reorganization program was to be carried out in Germany in order to free German labor.

I myself was one of those who demanded this. Neither Goebbels nor I, however, was able to carry out this plan. A committee of three, Lammers, Keitel, and Bormann, was formed; but owing. My Labor Allocation Department was further mentioned by Sauckel in his testimony. This worked as follows: Every large factory and every employer of labor had an allocation department which, naturally, came under mine.

None of these departments, however, encroached in the slightest degree on Sauckel's tasks. Their sphere of activity was not very great, as may be seen from the fact that each was one of 50 or 60 departments coming under my office. If I had attached very much importance to it, it would have been one of my six or eight branch offices.

Sauckel further mentioned the Stabsleiter discussions which took place in his office. A representative of my Labor Allocation Department for Army and Navy armament and for building attended these conferences.

At these meetings, which were attended by about 15 people who were in need of labor, the question of priority was settled on the basis of Sauckel's information on the state of economy generally. These were really the functions erroneously ascribed here to the Central Planning Board.

In addition it was asserted that I promoted the transport of foreign workers to Germany in April and that I was responsible for the fact that foreign workers were brought to Germany at all. That, however, is not true. I did not need to use any influence on Sauckel to attain that. In any case, it is evident from a document in my possession-the minutes of a Fuehrer conference of 3 May that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region was approved by the Fuehrer at Sauckel's suggestion.

I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on 18 April , showing that at that period I was still of the opinion that the German building industry, which employed approximately 1.

This speech which I made to my staff, in which I explained my principles and also discussed the question of manpower, does not contain any mention of the planning of a foreign labor draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans, surely I would have mentioned the subject in this speech. Finally, in connection with Sauckel's testimony, I must correct the plan of the organization submitted here. It is incorrect in that the separate sectors enumerated in it are classified under various ministries.

In reality these sectors of employers of labor were classified under various economic branches, independently of the ministries. They only corresponded where my own Ministry and the Air Ministry were concerned. It is also incorrect in stating that the building industry was represented in the Ministry of Economics. That came under my jurisdiction. From on, the chemical and mining industries, both of which are listed under the Ministry of Economics, were under my jurisdiction.

To my knowledge, these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan even prior to September and stated their requirements directly to Sauckel independently of the Ministry of Economics. This plan further is incorrect in stating that the demands for these workers from individual employers went directly to Hitler.

It would have been impossible for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers. As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter conferences, over which Sauckel presided. SPEER: I felt bound to preserve my documents so that the necessary transition measures could be taken during reconstruction. I refused to allow these documents even to be sifted.

They were turned over in their entirety to the Allied authorities here in Nuremberg, where I had a branch archive. I handed them over when I was still at liberty in the Flensburg zone. The Prosecution is thus in possession of all my documents to the number of several thousand, as well as all public speeches, Gauleiter speeches, and other speeches dealing with armament and industry; some 4, Fuehrer decisions, 5, pages of stenographic records of the Central Planning Board, memoranda, and so forth.

I mention this only because these documents show conclusively to what extent my task was a technical and economic one. I assume that otherwise the Prosecution would be in a position to produce something like that. Did you participate in the attempted assassination of 20 July? At that time I was against assassinating Hitler. President, this point is mentioned in interrogatories by the witness Kempf under Point 9 and the witness Stahl under Point 1. Both staffs were the nucleus of the attempt of 20 July.

After 20 July Fromm was hanged and Zeitzler was dismissed from the Army. A close contact developed through this collaboration, and these circles recognized my technical achievements. I assumed at that time that that was why they wanted to retain me. Of course, I was well known for the fact that for a long time I had spoken my mind emphatically and in public regarding the abuses which took place in Hitler's immediate circle. As I found out later, I shared the opinions of the men of 20 July in many points of principle.

SPEER: My closest contact with him, in my capacity of architect, was probably during the period from to September ; after that, the relationship was no longer so close on account of the circumstances of the war. After I was appointed successor to Todt a closer but much more official working relationship was again established. Because of the heavy demands made upon me by my armament work, I had very little opportunity to go to headquarters.

I only visited the Fuehrer's headquarters about once in 2 or 3 weeks. My 4 months' illness in the spring of was exploited by many people interested in weakening my position, and after 20 July the fact that I had been scheduled for the Ministry undoubtedly occasioned a shock to Hitler-a fact which Bormann and Goebbels used to start an open fight against me. The details are shown by a letter which I sent to Hitler on 20 December and which has been submitted as a document.

Attempts to discuss political or personnel problems with him always failed because of the fact that he was unapproachable. From on, he was so averse to general discussions and discussions on the war situation that I set down my ideas in memorandum form. Hitler knew how to confine every man to his own specialty.

He himself was therefore the only co-ordinating factor. This was far beyond his strength and also his knowledge. A unified political leadership was lacking in consequence, as was also an expert military office for making decisions.

This war has brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German people, and indeed started a world catastrophe. Therefore it is my unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for this disaster before the German people. This is all the more my obligation, all the more my responsibility, since the head of the Government has avoided responsibility before the German people and before the world. I, as an important member of the leadership of the Reich, therefore, share in the total responsibility, beginning with I will state my arguments in this connection in my final remarks.

SPEER: Of course, as far as it is possible according to the principles generally applied and as far as actions were taken according to my directives. Insofar as Hitler gave me orders and I carried them out, I assume the responsibility for them. I did not, of course, carry out all the orders which he gave me. President, I turn now to a second part of my evidence in the case of the defendant. This presentation is not meant to exonerate the defendant from those charges, brought against Speer by the Prosecution, which apply to his actual sphere of activity.

This part concerns itself rather with the accusations raised by the Prosecution against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint conspiracy. This second part is relatively brief and I assume that I shall be able to conclude my entire presentation of evidence within an hour. In this matter we are concerned with Speer's activity in preventing Hitler's destructive intentions in Germany and the occupied countries and with the measures he took and the attempts he made to shorten a war which he believed already lost.

I assume that the High Tribunal will agree to my presentation. Herr Speer, up to what time did you devote all your powers to obtaining the strongest possible armament and thus continuing the war?

SPEER: From a military point of view and as far as the general situation was concerned, it was certainly lost before that. It is difficult, however, to consider a war as lost and to draw the final conclusions as regards one's own person if one is faced with unconditional surrender. FLACHSNER: Did not considerations arising out of the production situation, of which you were in a position to have a comprehensive view, force you to regard the war as lost long before that?

SPEER: From the armament point of view not until the autumn of , for I succeeded up to that time, in spite of bombing attacks, in maintaining a constant rise in production. If I may express it in figures, this was so great that in the year I could completely re-equip infantry divisions and 40 armored divisions.

That involved new equipment for 2 million men. This figure would have been 30 percent higher had it not been for the bombing attacks. We reached our production peak for the entire war in August for munitions; in September for aircraft; and in December for ordnance and the new U-boats. The new weapons were to be put into use a few months later, probably in February or March of I may mention only the jet planes which had already been announced in the press, the new U-boats, the new antiaircraft installations, et cetera.

Here too, however, bombing attacks so retarded the mass production of these new weapons-which in the last phase of the war might have changed the situation-that they could no longer be used against the enemy in large numbers. All of these attempts were fruitless, however, since from 12 May on our fuel plants became targets for concentrated attacks from the air.

This was catastrophic. The success of these attacks meant the loss of the war as far as production was concerned; for our new tanks and jet planes were of no use without fuel. Between June and December I sent him 12 memoranda, all with catastrophic news. President, in this connection I should like to submit to the Tribunal a document, a Speer memorandum of 30 June It is reproduced on Page 56 of the English document book and will be Exhibit Number I should like to quote from this.

Speer writes to Hitler:. Speer informed Hitler in another memorandum, dated 30 August , on the situation in the chemical industry and the fuel production industry.

This is Page 62 of the English text, Exhibit Number I quote only one sentence:. Herr Speer, how was it possible that you and the other coworkers of Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do everything possible to continue the war? From the summer of on he circulated, through Ambassador Hewel of the Foreign Office, definite statements to the effect that conversation with foreign powers had been started.

Generaloberst Jodl has confirmed this to me here in Court. In this way, for instance, the fact that several visits were paid to Hitler by the Japanese Ambassador was interpreted to mean that through Japan we were carrying on conversations with Moscow; or else Minister Neubacher, who was here as a witness, was reported to have initiated conversations in the Balkans with the United States; or else the former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin was alleged to have been in Stockholm for the purpose of initiating conversations.

In this way he raised hopes that, like Japan, we would start negotiations in this hopeless situation, so that the people would be saved from the worst consequences. To do this, however, it was necessary to stiffen resistance as much as possible. He deceived all of us by holding out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of diplomatic steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victories through the use of new troops and new weapons and by systematically spreading rumors to encourage the people to believe in the appearance of a miracle weapon-all for the purpose of keeping up resistance.

I can prove that during this period I made continual reference in my speeches and in my letters, which I wrote to Hitler and Goebbels, as to how dishonest and disastrous I considered this policy of deceiving the people by promising them a miracle weapon.

In case of occupation by the Allies, Hitler had ordered a far-reaching system of destruction of war industries in all these countries; according to planned preparations, coal and mineral mines, power plants, and industrial premises were to be destroyed. But I informed him that as far as I was concerned this destruction had no sense and no purpose and that I, in my capacity of Armament Minister, did not consider this destruction necessary. Thereupon no order to destroy these things was given.

By this, of course, I made myself responsible to Hitler for the fact that no destruction took place. SPEER: All the military leaders whom I knew said at that time that the war was bound to end in October or November, since the invasion had been successful.

I myself was of the same opinion in view of the fuel situation. This may be clearly seen from the memorandum, which I sent to Hitler on 30 August, in which I told him that in view of this development in the fuel situation no operational actions by the troops would be possible by October or November. The fact that the war lasted longer than that can be ascribed only to the standstill of the enemy of Pensive in This made it possible to throttle our fuel consumption and to give the Western Front new supplies of tanks and ammunition.

In these circumstances I was perfectly willing to accept responsibility for abandoning the industries in the western countries to the enemy in an undamaged condition, for they could be of no use to them for at least 9 months, the transport system having been destroyed beforehand.

This memorandum coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in the blocked factories-a matter which Is dealt with this morning. It was a period of such hectic activity at. Later, in January , reports appeared in the French press on the rapid reconstruction of their undestroyed industries. Then, of course, serious charges were raised against me. This is a report by the field economics officer attached to the Wehrmacht commander for the Netherlands. According to this report, a decree by the Commander, West was still in existence in September This said that destructive measures were to be taken only in the coastal towns and nowhere else, and the field economics officer for the Netherlands stated, as may be seen from the document, that the order issued by the Commander, West was obsolete and that he himself had therefore decreed on his own initiative that the industries in Holland should be destroyed.

How was this possible and what did you do about it? SPEER: As a matter of fact, some overzealous lower officials caused the basic decrees not to destroy in the West to be ignored. Our communications system for orders had been largely destroyed through bombing attacks.

Seyss-Inquart had drawn my attention to the fact that destruction was to take place in Holland. He has already testified that I authorized him not to take destructive measures. This was in September In addition, in order to prevent such destruction, on 5 September , acting without authorization, I directed the managers of the coal and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in Luxembourg to prevent destruction in the Minette ore mines, in the Saar coal mines, and the coal mines of Belgium and Holland, et cetera.

In view of the hopeless war situation at that time, I, as the person responsible for supplying electric current, continued to furnish current to the undertakings on the other side of the front so that the pump stations in the coal mines would not have to stop working, because if these pump stations had stopped the mines would have been flooded.

Herr Speer, with regard to the other occupied countries apart from France, Belgium, and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent destruction? SPEER: From August , in the industrial installations in the Government General, the ore mines in the Balkans, the nickel works in Finland; from September , in the industrial installations in Upper Italy; beginning with February , in the oil fields in.

Hungary and the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this connection that I was supported to a great extent by Generaloberst Jodl, who quietly tolerated this policy of nondestruction. On the contrary, he ordered the "scorched earth" policy with special application to Germany. That meant the ruthless destruction of all animate and inanimate property on the approach of the enemy. This policy was backed by Bormann, Ley, and Goebbels, while the various branches of the Wehrmacht and the competent ministries opposed it.

Herr Speer, did the commanders of the armies in the wider German area that I have just defined have executive powers to carry out orders of destruction? As far as industries were concerned, those executive powers were vested in me. Bridges, locks, railroad installations, et cetera, were the affair of the Wehrmacht. The industrial region of Upper Silesia, the remaining districts of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, and Austria, of course, were protected against destruction in the same way as the German areas.

I made the necessary arrangements by personal directives on the spot-particularly in the Eastern Territories.

SPEER: I returned from a trip to the Western Front on 14 September and found the decree awaiting me that everything was to be destroyed ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counterdecree officially ordering all industrial installations to be spared. At that time I was very much upset about the fact that industries were.

It is on Page 58 of the English text of my document book; Exhibit Number SPEER: The scorched earth policy was officially proclaimed in the Volkischer Beobachter at the same time in an official article by the Reich press chief, so that I realized quite clearly that my counterdecree could not be effective for any length of time. In this connection I used a method which is perhaps typical of the means employed by Hitler's immediate circle. In order to dissuade him from the scorched earth policy, I made use of the faith which he induced in all his co-workers that the lost territories would be recaptured.

I made him decide between the two situations: Firstly, if these industrial areas were lost, my armament potential would sink if they were not recaptured; and secondly, if they were recaptured they would be of value to us only if we had not destroyed them. I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit Number 18, Mr.

President; Page 59 of the English text of the document book. This teletype. You sent this teletype message to Bormann before you discussed the contents with Hitler? SPEER: Hitler approved of the text which I suggested to him, in which I gave him the alternative of either considering the war as lost or of leaving the areas intact.

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Employees of these industries were immune from deportation to Germany as slave labourers and any worker who had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he were to work for a blocked industry. This system, although somewhat less inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still illegal. The system of blocked industries played only a small part in the over-all slave labour programme knowing the way in which it was actually being administered.

In an official sense, he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its extension. Speer was also directly involved in the utilisation of forced labour as Chief of the Organisation Todt. The Organisation Todt functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic Wall and the construction of military highways, and Speer has admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep it adequately staffed.

He also used concentration camp labour in the industries under his control. He originally arranged to tap this source of labour for use in small out of the way factories; and later, fearful of Himmler's jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as possible. Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in armament industries but contends that he only utilised Soviet prisoners of war in industries covered by the Geneva Convention.

Speer's position was such that he was not directly concerned with the cruelty in the administration of the slave labour programme, although he was aware of its existence.

For example, at meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labour were so large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 30th October, , Speer voiced his opinion that many slave labourers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and stated: " There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps.

In mitigation it must be recognised that Speer's establishment of blocked industries did keep many labourers in their homes and that in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied territories and in Germany.

He carried out his opposition to Hitler's scorched earth programme in some of the Western countries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk. Sources : The Avalon Project. Download our mobile app for on-the-go access to the Jewish Virtual Library. Himmler's speech before the SS leaders of 4th October , which clearly illustrated the happenings in the extermination camps, was not discredited as forgery by the defence, as it for instance happened with the 'Hossbach-Protokoll.

The diary contains remarks proving that the Jews in Poland were, except for a remainder of , quite annihilated. The accused also accepted these statements of Frank's and criticism was limited to the stupidity in handing over this incriminating diary to the 'opponents. He returned to this subject, which weighed on his mind also during his imprisonment in Spandau.

Streicher also condemned the mass murders of the Jews in his final address. For Fritzche, also in his final address, the murder of five million was a horrifying warning for the future.

These words of the accused's support my contention that in the Nuremberg Trial the accused as well as the defence have recognised as a fact that the mass murders of the Jews had taken place.

Still today I acknowledge as generally correct the reasons of my sentence by the International Military Tribunal. Moreover, I still today consider as just that I assume the responsibility and thus the guilt for everything that was perpetrated by way of, generally speaking, crime, after my joining the Hitler Government on the 8th February Not the individual mistakes, grave as they may be, are burdening my conscience, but my having acted in the leadership.

Therefore, I for my person, have in the Nuremberg Trial, confessed to the collective responsibility and I am also maintaining this today still. I still see my main guilt in my having approved of the persecution of the Jews and of the murder of millions of them. Sources: Suzman, Arthur and Denis Diamond.